Tracking the Court Through a Political Thicket: At-Large Election Systems and Minority Vote Dilution by Packer, Mark
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 23
January 1982
Tracking the Court Through a Political Thicket: At-
Large Election Systems and Minority Vote Dilution
Mark Packer
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more
information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark Packer, Tracking the Court Through a Political Thicket: At-Large Election Systems and Minority Vote Dilution, 23 Urb. L. Ann. 227
(1982)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol23/iss1/6
TRACKING THE COURT THROUGH A
POLITICAL THICKET: AT-LARGE
ELECTION SYSTEMS AND MINORITY
VOTE DILUTION
MARK PA CKER *
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's holding in Baker v. Carr I ushered the judici-
ary into the "political thicket."2 The Court held that voters' chal-
lenging malapportioned legislative districts in federal courts state a
justiciable claim' under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.5 Two years later, Reynolds v. Sims6 established the con-
* A.B., Washington University, 1979; J.D., Washington University, 1982.
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. Justice Frankfurter first used the phrase in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549,
556 (1946). The Court found a challenge to a malapportioned state legislature
(brought under the guarantee clause of Art. IV, § 4 of the Constitution) to present a
non-justiciable political question. The guarantee clause is discussed more fully in
notes 31 and 37-43 infra.
Prior to the apportionment cases, the Court had indirectly entered the political
thicket by recognizing a fundamental right to vote. Cases discussing the Court's in-
validation of artificial and unjustifiable barriers to free exercise of the franchise are
collected in notes 55-60 and accompanying text infra.
3. The Court established that voters have standing to challenge malapportioned
districts. 369 U.S. at 204-08.
4. Id. at 208-37.
5. Id. at 198-204.
6. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Between Baker and Reynolds, the Court decided two dis-
tricting cases without reaching the fourteenth amendment question. See Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (striking down Georgia's congressional districting statute
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stitutional guidelines for Courts to consider when passing on the va-
lidity of election systems. The Court reasoned that "[f]ull and
effective participation by all citizens in state government requires
. . . that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of
members of the state legislature."7 Since Reynolds, the judicial trek
through the thicket at times has been confused. The Supreme Court
has been less than a coherent guide.
Litigation in the voting rights area presents a common theme-the
litigant wishes to increase the representation of his partisans in the
legislative body so that legislative outcomes are more favorable to
himself and those who share his beliefs.' In the initial cases in this
area, the Court avoided dealing with such group representational
rights by concentrating on quantitative problems of population devi-
ations9 among districts. 10 Under the one person, one vote standard"
and construing U.S. Const., art. I, § 2, to require "that as nearly as practicable one
man's vote in a congressional election. . . be worth as much as another's"); Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (invalidating Georgia's county unit system of primary
elections).
7. 377 U.S. at 565.
8. See Dixon, The Court, the People, and "One Man, One Vote," in REAPPORTION-
MENT IN THE 1970s 7, 32 (N. Polsby ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Dixon]. Dixon
notes that the plaintiffs in all districting cases "are concerned about political represen-
tation in a personal, partisan sense." Their goal is to compel "a reshaping of legisla-
tive districts so that they and their fellow partisans will have a better opportunity of
electing like-minded legislators." Id.
9. The typical apportionment vote dilution case is raised under circumstances of
numerous state legislative districts; each with a different population and each electing
the same number of state officials. Voters in the larger districts allege that their votes
are of less weight than those of voters in the smaller districts. The issue focuses on
whether population deviations from the average district are impermissibly large. For
an in depth discussion of the Court's mathematical quagmire see R. DIXON, DEMO-
CRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS (1968) [herein-
after cited as R. DIXON]. See also cases collected at note 12 infra.
10. Most forms of unequal political districting are subject to constitutional attack.
Prior to Reynolds, Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) established that congres-
sional districting was subject to scrutiny. Reynolds and its companion cases involved
unequal state legislative districts. Reynolds held that both houses of a bicameral state
legislature must be apportioned on a population basis, reasoning that analogy to the
federal legislative branch was not proper. 377 U.S. at 568. See also Lucas v. Colorado
Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (reasoning that the equal population requirement
cannot be avoided by voter referendum approving apportionment of one house of a
bicameral legislature in a manner other than population).
Four years after Reynolds, the Court applied the apportionment standard to local
government units. See e.g. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (holding
the Constitution allows no substantial deviation from equal population in mapping
districts "for units of local government having general governmental powers over the
[Vol. 23:227
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol23/iss1/6
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION
the Court mandated districts of near equal population. 2 Realizing,
though, that quantitative answers do not necessarily lead to qualita-
tive group representation, 3 litigants pushed the federal judiciary to
consider questions of proportional representation.
Challenges to state and local use of multi-member 14 and at-large15
entire geographic area served by the body." Id. at 485). See also Hadley v. Junior
College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (school board election districts must have equal
population). For evaluations of the application of population equality principles to
local government, see generally Dixon, Local Representation: Constitutional Mandates
and Apportionment Options, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 693 (1968); Jewell, LocalSystems
of Representation: Political Consequences and Judicial Choices, 36 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 790 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Jewell]; Sentell, Avery v. Midland County: Re-
apportionment and Local Government Revisited, 3 GA. L. REV. 110 (1968); Sentell,
Reapportionment and Local Government, 1 GA. L. Rav. 596 (1967).
11. The Court first used the term in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963),
announcing that since the time of the nation's founding "[t]he conception of political
equality ... can mean only one thing--one person, one vote." Id.
12. The Reynolds standard provides that deviations from strict population equal-
ity are tolerable only if "based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectua-
tion of a rational state policy .. " 377 U.S. at 579. In subsequent cases the Court
sought to precisely define the area of allowable deviations. In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,
394 U.S. 526 (1969), the Court overturned Missouri's congressional districting plan
where district populations varied 2.8% below and 3.1% above the ideal plan. In White
v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973), the court overturned Texas' congressional redistricting
which deviated 2.43% above and 1.7% below the ideal.
The Court treats state legislature and local unit districting with greater leniency.
See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) (16.4% population deviation in districting
of the lower house of the Virginia legislature adequately supported by state's policy of
"maintaining the integrity of political subdivision lines"); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S.
182 (1971) (districting of a county board upheld despite an 11.9% deviation from pop-
ulation equality because the deviation was supported by legitimate state consideration
in fostering cooperation between the county and its constituent towns). In other deci-
sions the Court indicated that deviations not in excess of 10% are "minor" and do not
require justification. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (a maximum vari-
ance of 9.9% and an average variance of less than 2% are minor, and do not establish
a prima facie case of unconstitutionality); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973)
(deviation of 8% too minor to make out a prima facie case of invidious
discrimination).
13. See discussion at notes 82-92 and accompanying text infra.
14. In a multi-member district all voters within the district vote for and elect more
than one legislator to represent the district as a whole. In other words, the constitu-
ency of each of the legislators elected in a multi-member district is composed of the
entire district and not some subdistrict. By way of contrast, in a single member dis-
trict, voters elect one legislator who is their representative.
Single member districts comply with the one person, one vote standard where all
districts within the political unit are of near equal population. A multi-member dis-
trict complies with one person, one vote standard where the number of legislators
elected by the multi-member district corresponds with the population of that district
19821
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election systems constitute a major portion of political participation
litigation. 6 More than sixty percent of the nation's cities use the at-
large system to elect municipal governments.' 7 At-large elections
weigh heavily against inner city racial minorities.18 These elections
tend to give disproportionate weight to the votes of the majority
political group and, in turn, dilute votes of the community's racial
and political minorities.' 9
relative to the population of other districts. For example, if district A elects five legis-
lators, district B elects two, and all other districts within the unit elect one legislator,
then district A's population must be five times greater than the population of the
single member districts, and B's population must be twice that of the other districts.
See Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
15. The at-large system is a special type of multi-member district. In an at-large
district more than one legislator is elected by the voters and represents the entire
district. In contrast to the multi-member district, however, the at-large district en-
compasses the entire political unit. Multi-member and at-large districts may be con-
sidered identical for many purposes. Legal significance, however, should attach to the
facts that the at-large district is a district of the whole unit and the multi-member
district is one of many districts making up the political whole. See Jewell, stera note
10, at 799-800.
The at-large system is often used for the election of a city council. All city voters
vote for and elect the entire number of councilmen. The ward system is a competing
municipal election system where the city is divided into districts or wards with each
ward electing a single council member. For descriptions of the leading forms of mu-
nicipal government see D. GRANT & H. NIXON, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN
AMERICA 429-53 (2d ed. 1968); C. SNIDER, AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT (2d ed. 1965); H. TURNER, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: STATE AND LOCAL Gov-
ERNMENT (1968). Not all municipal at-large systems operate in the same manner;
variations are discussed at note 103 and accompanying text infra.
16. The bulk of the litigation involving at-large districting has been in the Fifth
Circuit. See cases cited in Bonapfel, Minority Challenges to 4t-Large Elections. The
Dilution Problem, 10 GA. L. REV. 353, 357 n.29 (1976). See also Note,,4t-Large Vot-
ing Dilution Claims: The Fih Circuit Requires Racialy Motivated Discrimination, 9
CuM. L. REV. 443 (1978).
17. MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK (1979). A study of municipal government reports that
the at-large system is in use in 63.7% of all cities reporting. Small cities especially use
the at-large system. Sixty-seven percent of cities with populations between 25,000 and
50,000 persons elect city governments at-large. The ward/district system is preferred
only in cities with populations greater than 500,000. 1d.
A city's propensity to elect officials at-large follows geographic lines. The study
notes that the most frequent users of the system are in the Pacific States (86.2%), the
Solid South (75.6%), and the Border States (67.6%). New England least favors the at-
large system (40.4%). Id. (The geographic terms are defined, id. at 97). See also
notes 115-17 and accompanying text, infra, for authorities detailing the reasons for
the wide use of at-large election systems.
18. See discussion at notes 105, 109 and accompanying text infra.
19. Multi-member and at-large districts are conducive to dilution of interest
[Vol, 23:227
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The Court's leading decisions, Whitcomb v. Chavis20 and White v.
Regester,2 left the lower federal courts with little guidance in dealing
with these claims. The Court has failed to adequately articulate the
scope of political participation rights recognized in the apportion-
ment cases. The Court has also failed to state how multi-member
and at-large suits fit into the constitutional framework developed in
Reynolds. The recent decision of City of Mobile v. Bolden22 illus-
trates the Court's struggle with these problems. In Bolden the Court
addressed for the first time the circumstances under which the at-
large election of a city council would unconstitutionally dilute minor-
ity votes. On the facts presented, the Court found no fourteenth or
fifteenth Amendment violation but it was badly divided in its
reasoning.23
This Note urges the Court to make a straightforward appraisal of
group voting rights-recognizing on one hand the value to republi-
canism of minority representation in legislative bodies, and on the
other hand, the federalist value of giving states and their political
subdivisions the maximum constitutional power to establish their
own forms of government. Thus, at issue is the very nature of repre-
sentative government.24 In passing on the issue, the Court must con-
cern itself with the proper role of the judiciary and the need for
group voting power. The interest group must be able to marshall a greater number of
voters sharing common interests to elect representatives than would be necessary
under a single-member system. This result is particularly distressing to racial minori-
ties residing in large numbers in compact areas capable of supporting one or more
single-member districts. For examples of how multi-member and at-large districts
dilute minority voting strength, see, e.g., Note, Racial Vote Dilution in Multimember
Districts: The Constitutional Standard after Washington v. Davis, 76 MIcH. L. REv.
694, 695 (1978); Comment, Effective Representation and Multimember Districts, 68
MICH. L. REV. 1577, 1587-88 (1970).
20, 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
21. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
22, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
23. Id. Justice Stewart issued the judgment of the Court and was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist. Justice Stevens concurred in the
judgment but disagreed with the plurality's reasoning. Justice Blackmun concurred
in the result, siding with the dissenters on the substantive issues but finding the lower
court's remedy inappropriate. Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall dissented. Id.
As this Note went to press, the Supreme Court decided another at-large case. In
Rogers v. Lodge, 50 U.S.L.W. 5041 (July 1, 1982) (No. 80-2100), the Court held inva-
lid the at-large system for electing members to the Burke County, Georgia Board of
Commissioners. For a further discussion of the decision, see note 191 infra.
24, See issues discussed at notes 27 and 31-33 and accompanying text infra.
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manageable standards.25
Section II of this Note discusses the importance of political partici-
pation and the participation rights recognized in the apportionment
decisions. Section III presents the problems associated with at-large
voting and lays the groundwork for Section IV's evaluation of the
treatment given vote dilution claims in the federal courts. Section V
analyzes the Court's decision in Bolden and suggests ways in which
the Court might more profitably deal with similar issues in the future.
II. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION RIGHTS
A. Political Theory and Participalion
The ability of citizens to participate effectively in the political pro-
cess is a value rooted in the Anglo-American political tradition.26
Representative democracy, the touchstone of this tradition, is based
on the recognition of the coercive power of government.2 7 A govern-
ment so intimately affects the well-being of its citizens that an effec-
tive check on its power is required in the form of popular control.
The citizens practice popular control through the medium of legisla-
tive bodies. The people elect the members of the legislative bodies to
represent their interests. The outcomes of the legislative process re-
flect compromises struck by the various interests represented. 28 Rep-
resentation is effective only if elected officials are accountable and
attuned to the needs of the electorate.29
Representative democracy thus involves two basic concepts. First,
25. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (The judiciary should intervene
only when the Court can formulate and apply manageable standards).
26. See, e.g., G. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRESENTA-
TION, POLITICAL POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT 14-22 (1966) (Baker provides a
concise review of the development of the equal representation in England and in
America from the colonial period forward).
27. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51,397,398-99 (Lippincott ed. 1864) (A. Ham-
ilton). In a familiar passage, Hamilton wrote
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external or internal controls on government would be necessary. In
framing a government, which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the gov-
erned; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the
people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
Id.
28. See Bonapfel, supra note 16, at 358.
29. Note, Challenges to At-Large Election Plans: Modern Local Government on
[Vol. 23:227
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a majority of the citizens should elect a majority of the representa-
tives. Second, a minority of the voters should elect a minority of the
legislators.3 0 As James Madison once stated, this constitutional guar-
antee of a republican form of government reflects both principles.31
Madison, writing at the time of the Constitution's adoption, argued
that broad participation was essential to republicanism.32 The more
interests that gained representation in governing bodies, he wrote, the
less chance majorities would develop to fence other interests out of
the political process.33 Minority representation not only protects mi-
nority rights from majority abuse,34 but also preserves vocal opposi-
Trial, 47 U. CIN. L. REV. 64,76 (1978). See also A. DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA, ch. I (R.D. Hefner ed. 1956).
30. John Stuart Mill stated,
In a really equal democracy, every or any section would be represented, not dis-
proportionately, but proportionately. A majority of the electors would always
have a majority of the representatives; but a minority of the electors would al-
ways have a minority of the representatives. Man for man, they would be as
fully represented as the majority. Unless they are, there is not equal government,
but a government of inequality and privilege: one part of the people would rule
over the rest: there is a part whose fair and equal share of influence in the repre-
sentation is withheld from them; contrary to all in just government, but above all,
contrary to the principle of democracy, which professes equality as its very root
and foundation.
J.S, MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 141-42 (Gateway
ed. 1962).
31. Madison's comments on the nature of republican government are found in
THE FEDERALIST No. 39, 301, 302 (Lippincott ed. 1884) (J. Madison). See also THE
FEDERALIST No. 10, 104, 109-12 (Lipincott ed. 1884) (J. Madison discussing how a
republic would control factionalism). In the guarantee clause, the Constitution pro-
vides: "The United States shall guarantee every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government. ... U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 1.
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, 111 (Lippincott ed. 1884) (J. Madison).
33. Id. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 39, 301, 302 (Lippincott ed. 1884) (J.
Madison) (arguing that it is essential to republican government "that it be derived
from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a fa-
vored class"). Thomas Jefferson expressed the same idea. In 1816 he wrote that "a
government is republican in proportion as every member composing it has his equal
voice in the direction of its concerns. . . by representatives chosen by himself. ... "
Reynolds v. Sims 377 U.S. 533, 573 n.53 (1964) (quoting Jefferson, Letter to Samuel
Kercheval, 10 WRITnOS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Ford ed. 1899)). Three years later
Jefferson stated, "Equal representation is so fundamental a principle in a true repub-
lic that no prejudice can justify its violation because the prejudices themselves cannot
be justified." Id. (quoting Jefferson, Letter to William King, JEFFERSON PAPERS, Li-
brary of Congress, Vol. 216, p. 38616).
34. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison). As one commentator notes,
however, minority representation will not always assure that republican government
will adequately protect minorities. This failing is the reason constitutional provisions
1982]
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tion to incumbent political interests.3-
B. Particopation Rights Before the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court recognizes that notions of republicanism and
similar expressions of political theory do not amount to an invitation
for judicial intervention on a grand scale into the political process.
Rather, the Court acknowledges the limits of judicial power and
deals with political participation claims only when they lend them-
selves to manageable standards.36
The Court established almost from the outset that claims under the
guarantee clause,37 which question the republican character of state
government present nonjusticiable political questions.38 In Colegrove
v. Green39 the Court declined to hear a challenge under the guarantee
clause concerning malapportioned state legislative districts.4 0 The
Court reiterated this position in Baker v. Carr,41 noting that the
clause is "not a repository of judicially manageable standards" on
which a court could rely to identify the lawfulness of state
government.42
insulate certain fundamental interests from the political process by placing them be-
yond the power of the majority to affect. Constitutionalism is rooted in the distrust of
majorities. Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1162, 1164
(1977). For a discussion by Judge J. Skelly Wright of problems faced by minority
groups in the political process see Wright, Professor Bilckel, The Scholarly Tradition,
4nd The Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REv. 769, 789 (1971).
35. Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause And The Three
Faces Of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945, 962 (1975) (The author analo-
gizes a proposed right to proportional representation to the recognized right of polit-
ical dissent emanating from freedom of expression. Id.).
36. See Baker v. Carr 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). In Baker the Court recognized
that even if intervention would enhance political equality, practical considerations
may force the Court to stay its hand. The principal consideration is whether a consti-
tutional idea can be formed into 'Judicially discoverable and manageable standards."
Id. In other words, the standard announced must be one that the Supreme Court can
communicate with precision to the lower courts and the political branches of govern-
ment. See Wilkinson, supra note 35, at 968-69.
37. For the language of the guarantee clause see note 31 supra.
38. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (held that Congress deter-
mines which of two "governments" claiming to represent the people of Rhode Island
is the true government).
39. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
40. Id. at 554.
41. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
42. Id. at 223.
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In Baker, however, the Court found apportionment claims justicia-
ble under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.43
Justice Brennan's majority opinion noted that placing political rights
at issue does not make the issue a political question.44 Refusing to
reach the merits, Justice Brennan left open the question of whether a
right to districting on the basis of population is a group right or an
individual right.45 Reynolds v. Sims 46 answered the question, how-
ever.47  The Constitution protects an individual voter residing in a
more populous district from dilution of his vote vis-a-vis the vote of
an individual in a less populous district.48 In so holding, Chief Jus-
tice Warren's opinion for the Court commented on the scope of polit-
ical participation rights. The Chief Justice argued that representative
government is essentially self-government and all citizens possess "an
inalienable right to full and effective participation in the political
process" of state legislative bodies.49  Representative government
thus requires that a majority of the citizens elect a majority of the
state's legislators.5° Minority control of the legislature is inconsistent
43. Id. at 237. The respective merits of the equal protection clause and the guar-
antee clause for handling apportionment issues is discussed in Bonfield, Baker v.
Carr: New Light On The Constitutional Guarantee of Republican Government, 50 CA-
LIF. L, REV. 245 (1962). See also Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause ofArticle IV, Section
4: A Study In Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REv. 513 (1962).
44. 369 U.S. at 209-210.
45. Note, Group Representation And Race-Conscious Apportionment: The Roles of
States And The Federal Courts, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1847, 1854 (1978).
46. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). For reactions to Reynolds see generally A. BICKEL, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REP-
RESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAw AND POLITICS (1968); Casper, Apportion-
ment And The Right To Vote. Standards Of Judicial Scrutiny, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 1
(P. Kurland ed.); McKay, Reapportionment: Success Story Of he Warren Court, 67
MICH. L. REV. 223 (1968).
47. The Court stated, "Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators
are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests." 377 U.S. at 562. The
Court thus adopted an individual emphasis which paved the way for an easily en-
forceable objective standard-one person, one vote. The cases involved in the Court's
quest for near mathematical equality among districts are collected at notes 10-12,
supra.
48. See 377 U.S. at 565. Equal protection, noted Chief Justice Warren, requires
the "uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to the [challenged]
governmental action. . . [and] all voters, as citizens of a State, stand in the same
relation regardless of where they live." Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. Compare the passage by John Stuart Mill quoted at note 30 and accompa-
nying text supra.
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with this democratic ideal." Because legislative actions affect all citi-
zens, the Court argued, legislators must be "collectively responsive to
the popular will."52
The rulings in Baker and Reynolds opened the Court to issues of
district apportionment, but these decisions were preceded by a devel-
oping line of cases using the fourteenth and fifteenth Amendments to
protect the right to vote. 3 Relying on the fifteenth amendment's pro-
hibition of the "denial of abridgement" of the right to vote on racial
grounds,54 the Court found unconstitutional the refusal of municipal
officials to count the ballots of black voters.5 Similarly, the Court
overturned other abridgements to voting rights such as the grandfa-
ther clause56 and the white primary. 7 Gomillion v. Lightfooll invali-
dated the redrawing of Tuskegee, Alabama's municipal boundaries
so as to exclude almost all blacks but no white residents.5 9 The Court
concluded that the twenty-eight sided figure "despoiled" only black
citizens and their previously enjoyed right to vote.60
51. 377 U.S. at 565.
52. Id.
53. Voting was long considered a privilege, not a right. Neither the Constitution
nor the Bill of Rights confers on citizens a right to vote. For a discussion of the
development of a constitutional right to vote, primarily through the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments, see Goulder, The Reconstructed Right To Vote. Neutral Princ-
pies And Minority Representation, 9 CAP. U.L. REV. 31, 34-39 (1979) and authorities
cited therein.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. For histories on the development of the
fifteenth amendment, see generally W. GILLETTE, THE RIGHT To VOTE: POLITICS OF
THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT (1965); J. MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE
AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT (1909); Lucus, Dragon .n
The Thicket: A Perusal Of Gomillion P. Lightfoot, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 194 (P. Kurland
ed.).
55. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
56. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
57. Terry v. Adams 345 U.S. 461 (1935) (using the fifteenth amendment to strike
down a pre-primary nominating procedure operated by a "club" of white Democrats);
Nixon v. Herudon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (using the fourteenth amendment to invali-
date a state law excluding blacks from voting in party primaries).
58. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 347. For a discussion of the implications of Gomillion for group political
participation rights see Chu, Polical Efficacy: The Problems of Money, Race, And
Control In Schools, 1977 WIs. L. REv. 989. See also Defner, Racial Discrimination
And The Right To Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523 (1973) (discussion of the history of
racial discrimination in voting from Reconstruction to the Voting Rights Act).
(Vol. 23:227
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Voting rights cases dominated the reapportionment era.6 1 The
Court found that unreasonable impediments to the exercise of the
franchise violated a fundamental freedom.62 The decision in Reyn-
olds built upon this development. The Court noted that "the right of
suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. '
63
The Court's requirement of careful and meticulous scrutiny64
stopped just short of the higher level of review required in fundamen-
tal rights cases, however.6 The leading voting rights case in the era,
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,66 recognized the importance of
the right to vote in preserving all other basic civil and political
rights.
67
The apportionment and voting rights cases demonstrate two cen-
tral themes behind the Supreme Court's intervention into the polit-
ical process. First, the franchise should be broadly based.68  This
includes not only the right of any citizen to participate in the selec-
tion of officials,69 but also the right to participate in the selection of
candidates7 ° and the ability to campaign and seek office71 on the
same terms as other citizens. An impediment to free exercise of the
61. See, e.g., Bums v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973) (upholding 50 day residency
requirement); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (invalidating one year resi-
dency requirement as unduly restrictive); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395
U.S. 621 (1969) (striking down a limitation on school board elections allowing only
parents of students and owners of taxable real property to vote); Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (finding unconstitutional state poll tax); Car-
rington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (voiding voting limit based on military status).
62. The Court first held that voting involves a fundamental right in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). See also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973) (defining perimeter of fundamental rights protec-
tion as rights "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution").
63. 377 U.S. at 561-62.
64. Id. at 561-62.
65. Casper, Apportionment and the Right to Vote: Standards of Judicial Scrutiny,
1973 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 15 (P. Kurland ed).
66. 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voiding Virginia's poll tax).
67. id. at 667. The Court relied expressly on the language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972). In
Dunn, the Court announced that "a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to
participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction." Id.
68. See Wilkinson, supra note 35, at 958.
69. The Court refers to this as the right to "register and vote without hindrance."
See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980).
70. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
71. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
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franchise is constitutional only if supported by a compelling state in-
terest.72 Second, given the right to unhampered voting, each vote
should count equally.73 The rule of one person-one vote provides a
judicially manageable standard,74 but only when translated into a
rule requiring essential mathematical equality among districts.
71
In adopting the equal weight value the Court made a decision on
the nature of representative government. 76 The apportionment hold-
ings preserve individual, rather than group, political participation
rights.77 Stated differently, equality of district population, not the
quality of representation, controls the determination.78
72. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966).
73. See Wilkinson, supra note 35, at 959.
74. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
75. See cases collected at notes 10-12, supra.
76. See Walker, One Man, One Vote: In Pursuit ofan Elusive Ideal, 3 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 453, 453 (1976). Walker argues that the Court's previous refusal to deal
with apportionment issues under the political question doctrine resulted from its in-
ability or refusal to adopt a justifying value which could serve as the basis for a man-
ageable standard. Id.
77. See notes 45-48 and accompanying text supra.
78. See, Dixon, supra note 8, at 12. Effective representation is a political concept
and cannot be divorced from the voting strength of groups of persons sharing com-
mon interests. See also Comment, Effective Representation and Multimember Dis-
tricts, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 1577, 1586 (1970).
The dissenters in Reynolds commented on the importance of interest groups in de-
termining the weight of individual votes. Justice Harlan argued that "people are not
ciphers and that legislators can represent their electors only by speaking for their
interests." 377 U.S. at 623-24 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan feared the
Court's individual vote language significantly encroached on the legislative determi-
nation of how interests should be balanced. Justice Stewart believed that as long as
effective majority rule existed, courts should not be concerned with unequal popula-
tions. He thought that equal numbers involved only part of the question of fair dis-
tricting. Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 749 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion replies to the majority opinion in Reynolds as
well as Lucas)
Representative government is a process of accommodating group interests
through democratic institutional arrangements. Its function is to channel the
numerous opinions, interests and abilities of the people of a State into the mak-
ing of the State's public policy. Appropriate legislative apportionment, therefore,
should ideally be designed to insure effective representation in the State's legisla-
ture, in cooperation with other organs of political power, of the various groups
and interests making up the electorate. In practice, of course this idea is approxi-
mated in the particular apportionment system of any state by a realistic accom-
modation of the diverse and often conflicting political forces operating within the
State.
Id. at 749 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 23:227
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol23/iss1/6
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION
The common thread running through the holdings in voting right
and apportionment cases is that the means of achieving effective rep-
resentation should be open and available to all.79 The claims, how-
ever, focus on the ends. Litigants, particularly in the apportionment
setting, seek to increase the impact of a person who shares their inter-
ests at the pay-off level-legislative outcomes."0 Recognizing this
point in Baker, Justice Frankfurter argued in dissent that the issue
was merely a guarantee clause claim masquerading under an equal
protection label."
The apportionment opinions run into problems when the Court in-
dicates that the protection of the means leads directly to the realiza-
tion of the ends. 2 Justice Black's opinion in Wesberry v. Sanders 3
first linked equal population districts with the equal representation
concept . 4 He asserted "equal representation for equal numbers of
people [is] the fundamental goal."8 5 Chief Justice Warren adopted
this language in Reynolds. 6 The decision in Reynolds turned in large
part on the democratic ideals of equality and majority rule. 7 The
Court reasoned that a majority of the legislators should represent the
interest of the political majority. 8
79. For a similar reading of the voting rights and apportionment cases see Wilkin-
son, supra note 35, at 957.
80. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
81. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Frankfurter stated,
"What is actually asked of the Court ... is to choose among competing bases of
representation-ultimately, really, among competing theories of political philoso-
phy-in order to establish an appropriate form of government." Id.
82. See R. DIXON, supra note 9, at 267-71.
83. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
84. See R. DIXON, supra note 9, at 270.
85. 376 U.S. at 18.
86. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 559-61. After a review of Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1 (1964) and Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), the Court concluded that
Wesberry established "the fundamental principle of representative government...
[is] equal representation for equal numbers of people, without regard to race, sex,
economic status, or place of residence within a State." 377 U.S. at 560-61.
87. 377 U.S. at 566.
88. Id. at 565. The Court in Reynolds evidently translated the language from Wes-
berry into a protection of majoritarianism. The Court did not indicate whether near
proportional representation for minority interests was also a hoped for goal. The
Court mentioned in passing that protection of minority interests is an inadequate ba-
sis for minority legislature control. The Court reasoned minorities possess other
means of protection in a constitutional system. Id. at 566.
See Bickel, The Supreme Court and Reapportionment in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE
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The Court's move from means to ends is untenable. The Court
fails to recognize, in the words of one commentator, that one person,
one vote "is a slogan not a political theory."89 Numerical equality
and proportional representation are not wholly consistent.90 The for-
mer denotes a "verifiable objective concept," while the latter is "a
highly subjective term connoting a hoped-for result."9 The Court's
equating of the two concepts is an archetypical example of moving
from the objective to the subjective without noting the shift.92
The one person, one vote standard imposes a limit on state district-
ing by mandating districts of equal population. Outside this limit,
however, states retain essentially unbridled discretion in determining
the relative electoral power of competing racial, ethnic, and economic
groups. 93 Numerical equality stands as only one factor in the dis-
tricting issue.94 Professor Dixon identifies the following four factors
which bear on interest group representation: first, where districts are
located; second, what voting interests each district maximizes or min-
imizes; third, what external constraints affect districting discretion
SEVENTIES 57 (N. Polsby ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Bickel]. Bickel criticized the
Court for failing to take into account values other than majoritarianism. He noted
Walter Lippman's distinction between majoritarianism and effective representation,
arguing that political institutions rest not on majoritarianism but on accommodating
various interests. Id. at 58 (paraphrasing W. LIPPMANN, THE GOOD SOCIETY (1943)).
For government to best reflect the will of the people, power and influence should be
more widely distributed than would be the case under a strict adherence to majoritari-
anism. Bickel at 59-60. Bickel noted that government in a pluralist society is essen-
tially one of minority rule. There is no single majority but many minorities which
band together for different purposes. Id. at 60 (discussing R. DAHL, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971)).
For excellent discussions of the pluralist nature of American politics see generally
R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (145-46 (1956); A. DEGRAZIA, PUB-
LIC AND REPUBLIC: POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN AMERICA (1951); Friedmann,
The Changing Content of Public Interest: Some Comments on Harold D. Lasswell, in
NOMOS V: THE PUBLIC INTEREST 84 (C. Friedrich ed. 1962).
89. Dixon, supra note 8, at 45.
90. See id., at 12.
91. R. DIXON, supra note 9, at 269.
92. Id.
93. See Note, Group Representation and Race- Conscious Apportionment: The Role
of States and the Federal Courts, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1847, 1854 (1978).
94. See Dixon, supra note 8, at 19. See also Dixon, Reapportionment in the
Supreme Court and Congress: Constitutional Struggle For Fair Representation, 63
MICH. L. REv. 209 (1964). Dixon argued that because "apportionment involves the
creation and control of political power, the group dynamics of American politics" are
crucial to the issue of effective representation. Id. at 218.
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and the impact of these constraints on effective voting; and fourth,
given districting decisions throughout the political unit, how closely
actual representation maps the relative numeric size of each interest
group.9 5
III. DISTRICTING, GERRYMANDERS, AND AT-LARGE DISTRICTS
A. The Districting Game
Districting is a form of gerrymandering because it discriminates on
the basis of residence.9 6 Gerrymandering simply involves districting
which by design or effect increases the political strength of one group
and decreases that of another.9 7 While gerrymandering is normally
associated with oddly drawn districts, it need not involve
distortions.9 8
Although a typical group-gerrymander claim involves the Reyn-
olds-type situation where districts are drawn with grossly unequal
populations, gerrymandering may take place in equal population dis-
tricts.99 The controversy shifts from how many persons reside in the
district to how many persons of a specific identification live there. °
A person is grouped in one district rather than another by the acci-
dent of his residence. The number of other district residents that
share his interests determine the weight of his vote at the pay-off
level-election results.' In other words, districts of equal popula-
tion discriminate because people are not fungible." 2
95. See Dixon, supra note 8, at 19-20.
96. See id. Dixon notes that all districting discounts the votes of minority voters
within a district.
97. See id. at 29-30. See also R. DIXON, supra note 9, at 459-63. For general
presentations of gerrymandering problems and suggested judicial solutions see gener-
ally Clinton, Further Explorations in the Political Thicket: The Gerrymander And The
Constitution, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1973); Edwards, Gerrymandering And "One Man,
One Vote," 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 879 (1971); Note, Political Gerrymandering: A Statu-
tory Compactness StandardAsAn Antidote For Judicial Impotence, 41 U. CHI. L. REV.
398 (1974).
98. See Dixon, supra note 8, at 29.
99. See Walker, One Man, One Vote: In Pursuit OfAn Elusive Ideal, 3 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 453, 467 (1976).
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See R. DIXON, supra note 9, at 272. Dixon states,
The distinctive thing about people, in contrast to trees or acres, is that people are
not fungible .... Although legislators are elected "by voters," as Chief Justice
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B. At-Large Election Systems
At-large districts"0 3 involve a subtle form of gerrymandering."
An at-large election system gives an advantage to any majority over
any minority.° 5 In theory, as a winner-take-all system the at-large
method allows an organized majority to elect all candidates of its
choice.' 06 Minorities are powerless to elect any candidates. 7 The
system is particularly distressing to large, coherent minorities, 0 such
Warren said, they are elected by voters who have interests which lead them to
organize for group political actions.
Id.
103. Although this section's focus is on at-large election systems, the impact of
such systems is generally applicable to multi-member districts. At-large district is
defined at note 15, supra. Multi-member district is defined at note 14, supra.
At-large districts do not all operate in the same way. Typically a majority vote is
required for victory. For example, a black candidate receiving a plurality because of
a split in the white vote may be defeated in the run-off election. An additional feature
is the "anti-single shot" requirement which requires a voter to mark his ballot for as
many candidates as there are positions. Thus voters may not vote only for a few
strongly preferred candidates but must also give votes to candidates less favored.
Some at-large systems divide the district into subdistricts and require candidates for
each seat to be a resident of a designated subdistrict. Although this feature prevents
voters from concentrating their votes behind several candidates in their subdistrict, it
may result in a more racially or ethnically diverse legislative body. See Bonapfel,
supra note 16, at 358-59.
104. See Dixon, supra note 8, at 54. Dixon describes the discrimination against
minorities resulting from at-large districting as "institutional gerrymandering." The
description is apt because the inequality of representation is built into the institutional
set-up of government.
105. The minority may be racial, ethnic, or political. See Jewell, supra note 10, at
798-805. Jewell notes that research on the effects of multi-member districts in several
states and at-large districts in several cities indicates that legislative bodies often will
be composed entirely on one political party. Id. at 801-802. In addition at-large elec-
tions tend to result in a disproportionately high number of representatives coming
from one ethnic group or socioeconomic group. Id. at 803.
106. Id. at 801.
107. Id. Voting power serves the important function of assuring a group of legis-
lative responsiveness. In other words, group members have greater control over legis-
lative behavior. Where an interest group lacks voting strength, it is an invitation for
elected representatives to become unresponsive to the group's needs. Legislators con-
centrate their efforts on behalf of voters with greater electoral power.
108. Dilution depends on the assumption that all or many members of a particu-
lar racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic group will vote together on a variety of issues.
Thus before group voting strength can be considered debased, group behavior must
be subject to accurate prediction. See Walker, One Man, One Vote: In Pursuit OfAn
Elusive Ideal, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 453, 483-84 (1976). See also United Jewish
Organizations of Williamsburg v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975); Zimmer v.
McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1309 (5th Cir. 1973) (Coleman, J., dissenting in part).
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as blacks," when they reside in compact geographic areas. Such
minorities could expect to elect one or more candidates of their
choosing had districting been along single-member lines." 0
At-large elections do not necessarily exclude racial minorities from
representation. Majority voters may ignore race in voting, or parties
may prefer racially balanced tickets."' Even in such circumstances,
an elected minority representative may be less effective in represent-
ing minority interests because of the need for majority support at the
polls.1 2 Only when voting is racially polarized and the political par-
ties are unresponsive to minority interests is minority defeat
absolute." 1
3
Dilution also depends on whether the area in which members of a particular group
reside is sufficiently compact to form a single-member, group controlled district.
109. In at-large jurisdictions blacks are generally not represented in legislative
bodies in proportion to their number in district populations. Blacks, however, are
overrepresented in some jurisdictions. Evidence indicates, though, that blacks tend to
be underrepresented to a greater degree in at-large districts than in single-member
districts. Disagreement is sharp within social science literature as to the extent at-
large elections disadvantage blacks. For a sample of this literature see Berry & Dye,
The Discriminatory Effects of At-Large Elections, 7 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 85, 113-32
(1979); Jones, The Impact of Local Election Systems On Black PoliticalRepresentation,
I 1 URB. AFF. Q. 345 (1976); Karnig, Black Representation On City Councils: The Im-
pact Of District Elections And Socioeconomic Factors, 12 URB. AFF. Q. 223 (1976);
Sloan, Good Government And The Politics Of Race, 17 SOc. PROB. 161 (1969).
Some commentators assert that the specter of racial gerrymandering may be over-
stated. Wilkinson argues that racial groups losing out in one district may constitute a
majority in another. In addition black minority voting groups may result in an im-
portant swing constituency. See, Wilkinson, supra note 35, at 972 n. 142. See also P.
DAVID & R. EISENBERG, STATE LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING: MAJOR ISSUES IN THE
WAKE OF JUDICIAL DECISION 22 (1962) (arguing that at-large or multi-member dis-
tricting is not inherently evil).
110. Single-member districts may dilute the voting power of minority groups as
well. Stated differently, single- as well as multi-member districts may be subject to
gerrymandering. See Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds County, 554 F.2d 139
(5th Cir. 1977) (en banc). Kirksey held that dividing a concentrated black community
into five districts violated the equal protection clause. This division resulted in a lack
of black registered voter majorities in any district, even though the districts were
drawn without regard to race. The court reasoned that the single-member plan de-
nied blacks access to the political process.
11l. See Jewell, supra note 10, at 802.
112. See E. BANFIELD & J. WILSON, CITY POLITICS 307 (1963). The authors ar-
gue that blacks gaining office in an at-large jurisdiction "generally find it necessary to
be politicians first and Negroes second." This necessitates downplaying the issues of
greatest concern to blacks as blacks. Id.
113. See Jewel, supra note 10, at 802. Jewell states that blacks tend not to fare as
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Racial or political motivations114 may lead to the adoption of at-
large systems, but the at-large election originally developed to serve
the objectives of municipal reform. Reformers in the early 1900's
urged cities to adopt council-major or council-manager governments
to remedy machine politics and other abuses associated with ward
government.' 1 5 Reformers believed that a small city council elected
at-large would remove city politics from parochial pressures and al-
low the council to deal with problems from a city-wide perspec-
tive." 6 Thus the council system by design renders municipal
government less responsive to the interests of subsections of the com-
munity." 7 Despite the intentions of municipal reformers, the at-
large election system renders the votes of substantial urban minorities
less effective. Dilution itself, however, does not necessarily violate
the equal protection clause.
IV. MULTI-MEMBER AND AT-LARGE DISTRICTS IN THE COURTS
A. Supreme Court Precedents
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of multi-mem-
ber districts in its initial legislative apportionment decisions. The
Court commented in Reynolds that multi-member districts may give
flexibility to districting as states struggle to meet one person, one
well as other minorities "presumably because of their geographic concentration and
because race is of greater concern to most voters than other ethnic distinctions." Id.
114. Dixon argues that no line can be drawn between racial or political gerryman-
ders. Rather, he asserts a racial gerrymander is a form of political gerrymandering
because the primary concern is the political impact on the racial minority. See R.
DIXON, supra note 9, at 464. See also Dixon, supra note 8, at 32.
115. See C. SNIDER, AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 1965)
(describing the origin, advantages, and disadvantages of city council and ward gov-
ernments and indicating a general preference for at-large elected city councils). See
also M. SEASONGOOD, LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1933); L. STEFFENS, THE SHAME OF
THE CITIES (1904).
116. See Jewell, supra note 10, at 804. Jewell describes the advantages and disad-
vantages of both the council and ward forms of government. See also Note, Chal-
lenges To At-Large Election Plans: Modern Local Government On Trial, 47 U. CIN. L.
REV. 64, 76-77 (1978).
117. See Jewell, supra note 10, at 804-805. Jewell's research into communities
recently shifting from single-member to at-large systems indicates that legislators be-
lieve that the shift produced significant changes in the way they conduct their repre-
sentative functions. Many legislators respond that they became more responsive to
the demands of the district's strongest political groups. Id.
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vote.' 8 But in a companion case, Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General As-
sembly of Colorado, the Court pointed to undesirable aspects of
multi-member districting. 119
A year later, Fortson v. Dorsey2 ' presented the Court with its first
opportunity to address the vote diluting effect of a multi-member sys-
tem. Plaintiffs alleged that the state's use of both single and multi-
member districts to elect the state senate unconstitutionally created
two classes of voters. Voters in the single-member class select their
own senator while voters in one sub-district of the multi-member
class must band together with voters in other subdistricts to select a
desired group of senators. Even then, the preferences of voters in
other subdistricts may nullify one subdistrict's choice of a representa-
tive. '2 The Court rejected the challenge noting that so long as the
state met the Reynolds test of substantial equality of population, it
satisfied constitutional directives.
122
Fortson qualified the Court's endorsement of multi-member dis-
tricting. The Court stated multi-member districts may be found un-
constitutional if "designedly or otherwise . . . [they] minimize or
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the
voting population."'I Despite quoting this standard in Gaffney v.
Cummings,'24 the Court validated districts drawn to coincide with
118. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 577. The Court argued that although both
houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned according to population,
one method of distinguishing the two bodies is to have one house, at least in part,
elected through multi-member districts.
119. Lucus v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
The Court noted that multi-member districts characteristically produce long, cumber-
some ballots and deny individual groups within the district a single representative
responsible directly to them. Id. at 731 n.21.
120. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
121. Id. at 437-38.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 439. The plaintiffs in Fortson had not alleged that they were members
of a cognizable "racial or political element" but only that they were voters residing
within a multi-member district. Id.
The language from Fortson was quoted with approval in Burns v. Richardson, 384
U.S. 73, 88 (1966). In Burns the Court sustained a plan to apportion Hawaii's state
senate among multi-member districts. Commenting on the Fortson standard the
Court stated that an invidious effect is more easily found where (I) districts are large
in relation to the total number of legislators, (2) districts are not appropriately subdis-
tricted to assure a broad distribution of legislators, and (3) multi-member districts are
extensively used in both houses of a bicameral legislature. Id.
124. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
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the relative political strength of the two major political parties. 125
This validation occurred despite a bias favoring one party. The
Court reasoned that equal protection cannot reach such political ger-
rymanders because "politics and political considerations are insepa-
rable from districting."'
126
In Whitcomb v. Chavis12 7 and White v. Regester, 28 the Court
squarely faced the dilution effect of multi-member districts on racial
minorities. Plaintiffs in "hitcomb, black ghetto residents, alleged
that the socioeconomic characteristics of the ghetto' 29 and the inter-
ests of its residents' 3 ' differed markedly from the characteristics and
interests of voters comprising the bulk of the multi-member district.
The district court found that because ghetto residents shared strong
interests in certain public policies, they were entitled to the ability to
elect representatives in proportion to their numbers.'
3
'
The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that the Fortson
standard was not met by the fact that the legislature did not represent
ghetto residents proportionately. 132 The Court found the claim de-
fective absent a showing that blacks were not allowed to register and
vote, participate in political party affairs, and participate in the selec-
tion of candidates. 133 The Court discovered no support in the record
for the assertion that the legislature ignored the black community.134
125. Id. The claim in Gaffney did not involve multi-member districting but dis-
tricting under a "political fairness" policy according to which districts were drawn so
as to maintain the relative distribution of power between the Democratic and Repub-
lican parties.
126. 412 U.S. at 753.
127. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
128. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
129. The district court held that the ghetto was essentially a separate community.
It differed in terms of housing conditions, income and education levels, and unem-
ployment rates from the other metropolitan areas in the remainder of the multi-mem-
ber district. Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. Supp. 1364, 1373-80 (S.D. Ind. 1969), rep'd
403 U.S. 124 (1971).
130. The district court found ghetto residents possessed "compelling interests" in
such legislative policies as urban housing, quality of schools and health care, employ-
ment training and opportunities, and welfare. Id. at 1380.
131. Id. at 1381-85. Although black ghetto residents comprised 17.8% of the dis-
trict's population, over a period of eight years only 5.97% of the representatives and
4.75% of the senators were residents of the ghetto area. Id.
132. 403 U.S. at 143-44.
133. Id. at 149-50.
134. Id. at 155. The Court noted, in addition, that black residents were a crucial
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The Court concluded that the ghetto's failure to achieve proportion-
ate representation resulted from election defeats and not from an in-
stitutional bias. 135  The judiciary should intervene, the Court
reasoned, only when an identifiable segment of the population is "de-
nied access to the political system."' 36
Two years later in White v. ]egester, 137 the Court found the requi-
site denial of access and sustained a challenge brought by black and
Mexican-American voters to a multi-member plan. The Supreme
Court largely adopted the factual findings of the district court. 138 The
district court had determined that both minority groups had suffered
from a history of official discrimination inhibiting their right to regis-
ter and vote. 139 In addition, structural features of the multi-member
system (a majority vote requirement and a rule requiring candidates
to run for specific seats"4 ) adversely affected the ability of minority
votes to elect candidates of their own race.14 1
The Supreme Court first addressed the claim of black voters, find-
ing that voters had elected only two blacks since Reconstruction. 142
The Court also found that the apparent lack of political power in the
black community encouraged the legislature to be unsympathetic to
the community's needs.' 43 This underrepresentation, combined with
the control of candidate slating by a predominantly white organiza-
tion" and continuous racial campaign tactics, 45 led the Court to
constituency of the Democratic Party and shared in the political party misfortunes at
the polls. Id. at 150-51.
135. Id. at 153. the Court reasoned that "cancelling out" of voting strength is
often "a mere euphemism for political defeat at the polls." More recently in United
Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 167 (1977), the Court noted that "there
is no authority for a proposition that the candidates who are found racially unaccept-
able to the majority, and the minority voters supporting those candidates, have their
[constitutional] rights infringed."
136. 430 U.S. at 154-55.
137. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
138. Id. at 769-70. The Court noted that it would look favorably upon factual
findings reflecting "a blend of history and an intense local appraisal of the design and
impact" of the districting system.
139. Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 724-27, 731 (W.D. Tex. 1972), rev'd in
part, afd in part sub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
140. These features are discussed in note 103 supra.
141. 343 F. Supp. at 725.
142. 412 U.S. at 766.
143. Id. at 767.
144. Id.
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conclude blacks had been unable to enter the political process in a
meaningful manner.'
46
The Court also found that Mexican-American voters 147 had re-
cently suffered invidious discrimination in areas of health, education,
housing, and employment. 14  Cultural and language barriers,
49
when viewed in conjunction with the recent removal of the poll tax
and other restrictive voting practices, 150 contributed to low registra-
tion and electoral success among group members. The Court held
that both black and Mexican-American plaintiffs had shown more
than a failure to control "legislative seats in proportion to [their] vot-
ing potential[s]."'' Rather, they demonstrated that their "members
had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to partici-
pate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their
choice.""'5
B. Dilution in the Ffth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit has played a leading role in the development of
vote dilution law.'53 Zimmer v. McKeithen,5 4 decided immediately
after Regester, allowed the Circuit to apply the Supreme Court's di-
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. The Court found that Mexican-Americans constitute an identifiable class
within the district. The court noted that Mexican-Americans constituted 29% of the
district's population and resided in a compact area in which they represented 78% of
the population. Id. at 768.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 768-69. The Court observed that only five Mexican-Americans had
been elected to the legislature since 1880.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 765-66.
152. Id.
153. For in depth discussions of the Fifth Circuit's role see Bonapfel, supra note
16, at 371-87; Note, Discriminatory Effect of Elections At-Large: "The Totality of Cir-
cumstances" Doctrine, 41 ALB. L. Rv. 363 (1977); Note, At-Large Voting Dilution
Claims: The Fifth Circuit Requires Racially Motivated Discrimination, 9 CuM. L. REV.
433 (1978).
154. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), af7'dper curiam on other grounds sub
nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). In Zimmer the
court held unconstitutional a municipal at-large plan. Although black residents were
a numerical majority of the parish they comprised only 46% of the district's registered
voters. Crucial to the decision was the fact that black voter registration had only been
allowed after 1962. See, Id. at 1301. See also, Bonapfel, supra note 16, at 372-73.
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rective. The test formulated in Zimmer consolidated the factors
deemed relevant in Regester.'5" The court considered the following
four factors primary: first, whether minorities lacked access to the
nominating process; second, whether legislators were unresponsive to
minority needs and aspirations; third, whether a tenuous state policy
underlies the preference for multi-member districting; and fourth, the
existence of past discrimination which has a continuing effect on mi-
nority participation in the election system.'56 Certain inhibiting fea-
tures built into the multi-member scheme may enhance a showing
under the criteria.157 In subsequent cases the court held that not all
of the criteria need be shown. 158 The trial court, however, must con-
sider each factor and base its ruling on the totality of the
circumstances. 5 9
The Fifth Circuit in a recent four case consolidation 160 made a
substantial attempt to redefine the constitutional standard applied in
multi-member and at-large district challenges. The leading case of
the foursome, Nevet v. Sides,' 6' established that a showing of racially
155. The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's invalidation of the at-large
plan but the affirmation was "without approval of the constitutional views expressed
by the Court of Appeals." 424 U.S. at 636. In a recent decision, City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 54 (1980), a majority of the court expressly rejected the Zimmer test.
See note 184 and accompanying text infra.
156. 485 F.2d at 1305.
157. Id. The "enhancing factors" include a majority vote requirement, anti-single
shot voting provisions, and the lack of provision for at-large candidates running from
specific geographic subdistricts. See note 103 supra.
158. See 485 F.2d at 1305. See, e.g., NAACP v. Thomas County, 571 F.2d 257
(5th Cir. 1978); Black United for Lasting Leadership, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 571
F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1978); Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978) rev'd
446 U.S. 54 (1980); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978); David v. Garrison,
553 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1977); Perry v. Opelousas, 515 F.2d 639 (5th Cir. 1975); Wal-
lace v. House, 515 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
425 U.S. 947 (1976); Brandas v. Rapids Parish Policy Jury, 508 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir.
1975); Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1973).
159. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d at 226.
160. NAACP v. Thomas County, 571 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1978); Blacks United for
Lasting Leadership, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 571 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1978); Bolden v.
City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 446 U.S. 54 (1980); Nevett v.
Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978).
161. 571 F.2d 209. In Neyett black residents of Fairfield, Alabama, brought suit
challenging the municipal at-large election system. Under this system, twelve coun-
cilmen are selected, two from each of six districts. The court upheld the system, find-
ing the district court's conclusion that only one of the Zimmer criteria had been
shown by the plaintiffs not clearly erroneous.
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motivated discrimination is necessary to an equal protection or
fifteenth amendment claim. The court reasoned that a showing of
such intent was compelled by the Supreme Court's opinion162 in
Washington v. Davis.1 63 The court viewed purposeful discrimination
as a "universal" prerequisite to any racial discrimination claim. It
found no basis to distinguish claims of racial discrimination in vote
dilution setting."64
The court in Nevett turned next to requirements for satisfying in-
tent. Plaintiffs need not show racial motivation in the adoption of the
at-large system.' 65 Rather a plan, racially neutral at its enactment,
may later supplant other discriminatory devices or may be main-
tained for invidious purposes. 6 6 Circumstantial evidence also may
serve as the basis of intent.' 67 The court ruled that the Zimmer crite-
ria provide a factual basis from which the necessary intent may be
inferred. 16
8
162. Id. at 218.
163. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Court in Washington held that where official action
is racially neutral on its face, courts must follow "the basic equal protection principle
that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must be ulti-
mately traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." Id. at 240. See also Personnel
Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights v. Met-
ropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). For discussions of the development
of the intent requirement see Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem
of UnconstitutionalLegislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95. Note, Racial Vote Dlih-
tion in Multimember Districts: 2he Constitutional Standard After Washington v. Da-
vis. 76 MICH. L. REV. 694, 704-13 (1978).
164. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d at 218. The Fifth Circuit noted that the Supreme
Court in Washington relied on Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964). This case
refused equal protection and fifteenth amendment relief to the plaintiff for an alleged
racial gerrymander in New York's congressional apportionment. 571 F.2d at 218.
See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
165. 571 F.2d at 221. The court in Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238 (5th
Cir. 1978) (en banc), rev'd, 446 U.S. 54 (1980), rejected the city's argument that a
finding of discriminatory intent could not be found where blacks were effectively dis-
enfranchised at adoption of the election system. Rather maintenance of a discrimina-
tory system with the intent to disadvantage blacks, once blacks were allowed to vote,
is enough. See Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d at 221.
166. 571 F.2d at 221.
167. Id. at 222.
168. Id. at 222-23. In Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875, 880-81 n.9 (5th Cir. 1979),
the court stated that after Nevett, the Zimmer criteria are required to do double-duty.
Id. "[Tihey must show that the effect of the multi-member system is to dilute minor-
ity voting power and they must show discriminatory intent in the institution or con-
tinuation of this electoral system." Id.
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The court, after elaborating on the substance of the Zimmer fac-
tors, 169 addressed the method of review. The trial court must assess
the evidence presented under each criterion and then view the find-
ings in the aggregate. 7° The process is an intuitive assessment of the
likelihood that the decision to adopt or maintain the challenged sys-
tem was designed to further an unconstitutional objective. 7
V. CITY OF MOBILE AND BEYOND
A. The Supreme Court Rejects the Ffth Circuit's Approach
In City of Mobile v. Bolden,'172 a badly divided Court 173 addressed
a racial vote dilution claim under an at-large system for the first time.
i he district court' 74 and the Fifth Circuit'75 had sustained the chal-
lenge which black residents had brought under the equal protection
clause and fifteenth amendment.
The district court found that although no formal impediments pre-
vented blacks from voting or seeking office, the local political process
was not open to blacks on equal terms and white residents.' 76 The
court based its conclusion on racially polarized voting which contrib-
169. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d at 222-24. The court concluded that evidence of
racial bloc voting would henceforth be a key indicator of discriminatory intent. See
United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 166 & n.24 (1977) (the Supreme
Court noted the pervasiveness of bloc voting and concluded that "if voting does not
follow racial lines, the [white voter] has little reason to complain"). See also Beer v.
United States 425 U.S. 130, 144 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). For criticism of reli-
ance on bloc voting see Note, Group Representation and Race-Conscious Apportion-
ment: The Roles of States and the Federal Courts, 91 HARV. L. Rav. 1847, 1852-53
(1978).
170. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d at 224. See Blacks United for Lasting Leadership,
Inc. v. Shreveport, 571 F.2d 24* (5th cir. 1978) (en banc). In Blacks United the court
overturned and remanded the district court's decision holding unconstitutional an at-
large system. A majority of the Fifth Circuit found the findings of fact inadequate to
support intent. Judge Wisdom, however, accurately pointed out in dissent that the
findings were at least as specific as those accepted in Nevett and Bolden. Id. at 257
(Wisdom, J., dissenting).
171. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d at 224 n.20. See also Brest, supra note 163, at 121-
22.
172. 446 U.S. 54 (1980).
173. See note 23 supra.
174. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
175. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (consoli-
dated with Nevett v. Sides).
176. 423 F. Supp. at 387; 571 F.2d at 243.
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uted to consistent defeats for blacks at the polls and the reluctance of
blacks to run for office.' 77 The district court also found that local
officials were unresponsive to the needs of the city's racial minorities
and discriminated in the provision of public services and employ-
ment.178 The court concluded that Mobile's seventy year old at-large
system invidiously disadvantaged .black voters. The court therefore
ordered the city to dismantle and replace the system with a ward gov-
ernment. 179 The Fifth Circuit affirmed. It found that although the
system was not adopted with the purpose of inhibiting minority par-
ticipation, it was "archetypical of the intentionally maintained plan
• ..contemplated in Nevet."
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Stewart, speaking for a plu-
rality of four,"" agreed with the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that dis-
criminatory intent formed the basis of a fifteenth amendment'8 2 or
equal protection 8 3 violation. The plurality, unlike the Fifth Circuit
in Nevelt, determined that satisfaction of the Zimmer criteria pro-
vides an insufficient demonstration of purpose.' 84
The plurality gave little indication of what evidence would count
toward a showing of discriminatory intent.' 5 Justice Stewart con-
177. 423 F. Supp. at 389; 571 F.2d at 243.
178. 423 F. Supp. at 390-93; 571 F.2d at 244-45. The evidence included Mobile's
failure to employ more than a token number of blacks for higher levels of public
service. The district court found drainage systems, roads, and sidewalks in black
neighborhood were allowed to continue in disrepair. In addition, the court cited un-
responsiveness by the city's police department to racial violence.
179. 571 F.2d at 246-47.
180. Id. at 246.
181. Justice Stewart's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Powell and Rehnquist. 446 U.S. at 58.
182. 446 U.S. at 62-65 (plurality opinion by Stewart, J.) The plurality after re-
viewing prior case law concluded the fifteenth amendment "prohibits only purpose-
fully discriminatory denial or abridgment by government of the freedom to vote 'on
account of race... ." Id. at 65. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
183. 446 U.S. at 65-70. The plurality did note, however, that dicta from the
Court's prior opinions had indicated that disproportionate effect, without intent, was
enough to establish an equal protection violation. Id. at 66. See note 123 and accom-
panying text supra.
184. 446 U.S. at 73. A majority of the Court agreed that Zimmer should be re-
jected. See id. at 90 (Stevens, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 90-91 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the plurality requires a
showing of subjective intent). With the rejection of the Zimmer criteria and the fail-
ure of a majority of the justices to agree on an intent test, the Supreme Court pro-
vided little guidance to the lower courts. See Jones v. City of Lubbock, 640 F.2d 777,
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centrated instead on the inadequacy of the district court's findings.
He noted that the failure of blacks to achieve office is of little rele-
vance so long as blacks are able to register and vote without hin-
drance, and there is no official obstacle to black candidacy.' 86 In
addition, evidence of unresponsiveness and discrimination by public
officials lacks a close relation to the constitutionality of the system
through which the officials reached office.' 8 7
The plurality next rejected the notion that intent could be drawn,
in part, from a state's history of official race discrimination.' 88 Jus-
tice Stewart concluded that the structural features of an at-large sys-
tem, such as a majority vote requirement,189 inherently disadvantages
all political minorities. The structural features, however, do not indi-
cate an intent to discriminate against black voters.'9 '
By stripping the at-large dilution claim of its circumstantial sup-
port, the plurality apparently believed that a successful challenge
779 (5th Cir. 1981) (Goldberg, J., specially concurring) (arguing that the task of devel-
oping a coherent doctrine has fallen to the appellate and trial courts).
The Fifth Circuit has experienced much difficulty in attempting to give Bolden con-
tent. In McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1981), Judge
Kravitch's opinion interpreted Bolden as requiring a showing that the election system
was purposefully designed or maintained to minimize a district class' voting power
and that the election system had that effect. Id. at 1248. The judge asserted that
Bolden specifically rejected consideration of whether whites campaigned for black
support and whether elected officials were unresponsive to minority needs and inter-
ests.
But in Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1981), af'd, 50 U.S.L.W. 5041
(July 1, 1982) (No. 80-2100), Judge Fay, after an exhaustive review of vote dilution
law, held that Bolden requires a governmental unresponsiveness showing to state a
prima facie case. Id. at 1373. In addition to unresponsiveness, the plaintiffs must
present sufficient evidence to support the implication of discriminatory intent. The
trial court must make a specific determination of purpose given the totality of the
circumstances. In making this determination the court may consider many factors,
including the Zimmer criteria, so long as satisfaction of Zimmer does not lead auto-
matically to a finding of discriminatory intent. Id. at 1375. The implications of
Lodge are spelled out further in its companion cases, Cross v. Baxter, 639 F.2d 1383
(5th Cir. 1981); and Thomasville Branch of NAACP v. Thomas County, 639 F.2d
1384 (5th Cir. 1981). But see Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d at 1381-82. (Henderson, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Bolden demands emphasis on "official state denial of equal
participation" in candidate slating and the election process, and eschews heavy reli-
ance on socio-economic data).
186. 446 U.S. at 73.
187. Id. at 73-74.
188. Id. at 74.
189. See note 103 supra.
190. 446 U.S. at 74.
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must be premised on a subjective showing that the legislature in-
tended to enact a discriminatory election system. 19' Justice Stevens
191. Id. at 90 (Stevens, J., concurring).
In a recently decided case, the Supreme Court appeared to abandon the approach
taken by the plurality in Bolden. In Rogers v. Lodge, 50 U.S.L.W. 5041 (July 1, 1982)
(No. 80-2100), the Court affirmed a district court's finding that the at-large system for
electing County Commissioners in Burke County, Georgia, while "neutral in origin,"
was "being maintained for invidious purposes" in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment. .d. at 5043.
Justice White, speaking for six members of the Court, appeared to relax the quan-
tum of evidence necessary to satisfy the discriminatory purpose requirement under
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Contrary to the plurality's approach in
Bolden, the Rogers Court was willing to infer an invidious purpose based on a subjec-
tive examination of local conditions and voting practices. The Court did not require
proof that particular officials acted with an impermissible intent. Rather the Court
ruled that "determining the existence of a discriminatory purpose 'demands a sensi-
tive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be avail-
able."' 50 U.S.L.W. at 5042, quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
The Court detailed the District Court's findings that justified the holding. 50
U.S.L.W. at 5044-45. The Court first noted the "overwhelming evidence of bloc vot-
ing along racial lines." Observing that bloc voting enabled elected officials to disre-
gard black interests with political impunity and resulted in the defeat of black
candidates at the polls (the majority of county's registered voters were white), the
Court surmised that "[blecause it is sensible to expect that at least some blacks would
have been elected in Burke County, the fact that none have ever been elected is im-
portant evidence of purposeful exclusion." Id. at 5044.
The majority also found that historical discrimination hampered the ability of
blacks to participate effectively in county political processes. Id. In addition, the
Court mentioned the District Court's finding that elected county officials "have been
unresponsive and insensitive to the needs of the black community, which increases
the likelihood that the political process was not equally open to blacks." Id. Finally,
the Court noted that the size of the county and the requirements for being elected
operated "to minimize the voting strength of racial minorities." Id. at 5045.
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented. Id. He accused the majority
of supporting its holding with "largely sociological evidence," a type of proof deemed
insufficient in Bolden. Id. While Justice Powell agreed that the fourteenth amend-
ment required a subjective inquiry into the intent of local officials, id. at 5046, he
believed that the majority's ad hoc approach permitted federal courts to intrude "into
an area of intensely local and political concern" with few constitutional guidelines.
Id. at 5045.
Justice Stevens dissented on other grounds. Id. at 5046-52. Elaborating on the
approach he outlined in Bolden (see notes 192-200 infra), Justice Stevens argued that
the Court should base its determination of purposeful discrimination on an objective,
rather than subjective, inquiry into the local circumstances surrounding the chal-
lenged electoral system. Under this approach, plaintiffs must demonstrate that fea-
tures of the challenged system "have such an adverse impact on the minority's
opportunity to participate in the political process that this type of government de-
prives the minority of equal protection of the law." Id. at 5048. Local officials must
then justify the features. Id. Since the parties had not addressed these questions,
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concurred in the judgment but disagreed with this approach. Justice
Stevens drew a distinction between "state action that inhibits an indi-
vidual's right to vote and state action that affects the political strength
of various groups" engaged in competition for political power.192 In
the first category he grouped fundamental voting fights and appor-
tionment claims.193 In the second category, Justice Stevens placed
actions involving political gerrymanders-suits calling "into question
a political structure that treats all individuals as equals but adversely
affects the political strength of a[n] ...identifiable group."' 194 At-
large dilution claims fall within the latter class.
19 5
Justice Stevens noted that there is no functional difference between
racial gerrymanders and other political gerrymanders.196 Both forms
should face the same constitutional standard. 97 He presented a three
part test based on the characteristics of gerrymanders condemned in
Gomillion v. Lightfoot.'9 8 Politically discriminatory districting is un-
constitutional if first, it is clearly not the result of a normal or tradi-
tional political decision; second, it lacks support by a "neutral
justification"; and third, the districting decision is completely irra-
tional or "entirely motivated" by a desire to limit the political power
of a minority. 199 As an appendage to his test Justice Stevens com-
mented that a political decision should not be upset merely because
some irrational or invidious factors played some role in its passage or
continuation.2 °°
Justice Blackmun, concurring in the result, agreed with the dissent
Justice Stevens believed that the record did not provide an "adequate basis for deter-
mining the validity of Burke County's governmental structure on the basis of tradi-
tional objective standards." Id.
192. 446 U.S. at 83-84 (Stevens, J., concurring).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id at 87-88 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing, in the long run, no more cer-
tainty exists that members of racial groups are more apt to vote alike than members of
other interest groups). Justice Stevens noted, in addition, "there is no national inter-
est in creating an incentive to define political groups by racial characteristics." Id. at
88.
197. Id. at 89 (Stevens, J., concurring).
198. 364 U.S. 339 (1970). For discussions of the case, see notes 58-60 and accom-
panying text supra.
199. 446 U.S. at 90-91 (Stevens, J., concurring).
200. Id.
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that the city's system unconstitutionally debased the voting strength
of black citizens.2 ' Justice Blackmun, however, found that the na-
ture of the violation did not justify the scope of the trial court's rem-
edy.2" 2 He reasoned that a restructuring short of a mandated mayor-
ward government could have removed the constitutional infirmity
and accommodated Mobile's preference for council government.
20 3
Justice Marshall dissented,204 arguing that the plurality erred in
holding that at-large dilution comes within the equal protection stan-
dard established to deal with racial discrimination claims.205 To the
contrary, dilution actions are premised on a fundamental interest in
voting2°6 and therefore the intent requirement of Washington v. Davis
does not affect the claims.2 7 Justice Marshall reasoned that a show-
ing of "invidious effect" meets the constitutional requirement.20 8
Justice Marshall found support for his fundamental-interest ap-
proach in Reynolds v. Sims. Language in Reynolds indicates that the
right to vote is fundamental in a free and democratic society.20 9 Mar-
shall correctly characterized Reynolds as a vote dilution case 210 and
concluded that subsequent dilution cases had firmly established "a
substantive constitutional right to participate on an equal basis in the
electoral process. '  He further contended that his theory would not
open the courts to every political group finding itself outvoted.
Rather, the only groups to state a claim are those ignored by the con-
trolling political factions due to their "electoral discreteness and
insularity."2
12
B. Narrowing the Issues ofAt-Large Dilution
Since political majorities cannot be relied upon to respond ade-
201. Id. at 81-82 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Justices Brennan and White filed separate dissents.
205. Id. at 104-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 112-14 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 115-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id at 122 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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quately to minority interests,2 13 the judiciary has consistently acted as
a protector of minority rights. The courts, however, operate within
the context of political realities and recognize their limited power to
affect these realities.
214
The at-large claim arises from the same set of political circum-
stances which motivated voters to bring suits in the Reynolds v. Sims-
type apportionment case. Stated differently, in both at-large and
traditional apportionment cases the litigants seek to reallocate the
distribution of political power to the group interests with which they
identify.215 In both cases claimants essentially ask the judiciary to
define what constitutes a republican form of government. The Court
refused the challenge in Baker v. Carr.216 It apparently believed that
a standard based on the guarantee clause could not be limited to
malapportioned districts but would involve the judiciary in a variety
of suits questioning the representativeness of government. The Court
found more convenient the individual-oriented standard of one per-
son, one vote.
2 17
The issue of what rights interest groups possess in republican gov-
ernment is not so easily avoided in the at-large dilution context. The
claims are not susceptible to an individually based test. Essentially
the questions raised are the same as those considered in Baker-
whether the courts should intervene in the local political processes,
and if so, under what circumstances and to what extent should they
intervene.
Justice Marshall's fundamental-interest theory218 is not helpful in
resolving these questions. Basically the fundamental rights doctrine
protects an individual from the deprivation of a constitutional right
because of some personal characteristic, racial or otherwise.219 Pro-
ponents of this approach argue that not only is the act of voting fun-
damental, but so is the act of casting a meaningful vote.220 The
argument forces its adherents into an extreme position. Dilution of
213. See notes 26-29 and accompanying text supra.
214 See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
215. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
216. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra.
217. Id.
218, See notes 205-13 and accompanying text supra.
219. See notes 53-67 and accompanying text supra.
220. See, e.g., Note, Equal Protection: Analyzing The Dimensions fA Fundamen-
tal Right-The Right To Vote, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 163 (1977).
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voting strength is divorced from the racial claim and the suit stands
as one alleging the debasement of the votes of any group finding itself
in a political minority. In other words, the fundamental rights posi-
tion does not conceptually allow the segregation of claims based on
race from those based on other claims of minority status.
By definition, an at-large district treats all voters equally.22' A
voter's asserted membership in a group provides the basis for a dilu-
tion complaint.222 At-large districting does not involve the individ-
ual deprivation characteristics of a fundamental rights violation.
Rather the election system-neutral on its face-imposes a dispro-
portionate impact on a particular class of person. Such a dispropor-
tionate impact forms the heart of Washington v. Davi. 22 3
The plurality's approach in City of Mobile is equally unsatisfying.
The plurality's belief that plaintiffs must show direct intent on the
part of decisionmakers to discriminate against racial224 minorities
cuts against the Court's long standing recognition that subtle schemes
of discrimination are no less repugnant to the Constitution than di-
rect schemes. 225 By removing all bases for a circumstantial showing,
the plurality left aggrieved racial minorities with an intolerable bur-
den of proof.
VI. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A STEVENS-BLACKMUN RULE
Justice Stevens provided the most persuasive framework in City of
Mobile. He stated that legislation preventing or inhibiting black citi-
zens from voting falls into a different class from statutes which sub-
merge black votes by the creation of at-large districts.226 Clearly
both classes can operate to fence blacks out of the political decision-
making process. The point of distinction is in the remedy. In the first
class of cases, the remedy is to overturn impediments which aim ex-
clusively at blacks or other racial minorities. In the second class, the
statute is race-neutral and adversely affects members of all political
minorities. A remedy exclusively protecting blacks and other insular
minorities would alter the distribution of political power to favor
221. See 446 U.S. at 87-88 (Stevens, J., concurring).
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See note 185 and accompanying text supra.
225. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939).
226. See notes 186-90 and accompanying text supra.
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these groups but deny a like remedy to the community's other interest
minorities.227 As a result, the Sevens three-part test applies to all
political gerrymanders.
The test may be more rigorous than desired if the claims could be
exclusively limited to race. It is much less open-ended, however, than
the fundamental-interest approach which grants relief on a mere
showing of group submersion.228 A literal reading of the require-
ment suggests that no at-large system could be defeated due to the
strong interest which a municipality may have in commission govern-
ment. The judiciary could read this factor as requiring a court to
balance the respective political interests of the community and of its
constituent groups. A judicial remedy is justified where the discrimi-
natory effect on sizeable groups outweighs benefits adhering to the
municipality from continuation of the at-large system.229 The rem-
edy, as Justice Blackmun noted in City of Mobile, should take into
account the "compelling interest" of the city and its residents in at-
large government.23 The remedy could be to divide the community
into a few multi-member districts, or to adopt a combined system of
at-large and single-member districts."3 The Stevens rule combined
with the Blackmun remedy suggests a manageable course of action
for the courts.
227. Justice Stevens reaches essentially the same conclusion. 446 U.S. at 83-88.
See note 196 supra.
228. For the basic standard applied under the fundamental interest doctrine see
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1088, 1120
(1969).
229. See note 199 and accompanying text supra. See also McMillan v. Escambia
County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1243 (5th Cir. 1981) (describing Justice Steven's opinion as
requiring a very strict intent showing).
230. See notes 201-204 and accompanying text supra.
231. See notes 202 and accompanying text supra.
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